Growing with Water Hazards in California: State and Local Leadership for Climate Adaptation in Comprehensive General Land-Use Plans by Hajarizadeh, Emily
[253] 
COMMENTS 
EMILY HAJARIZADEH 
Growing with Water Hazards in California: 
State and Local Leadership for Climate 
Adaptation in Comprehensive General  
Land-Use Plans 
Introduction ...................................................................................... 254 
I. Beyond the Mitigation Framework: Rising Challenges 
and the Call for Climate Adaptation Planning ...................... 257 
II. Federal and State Water Resource Management: A
Cooperative Governance Framework ................................... 258 
A. Federal Flood and Water Quality Management ............. 259 
1. Compulsory Hazard Mitigation Planning Under
the Disaster Management Act: Why Financial
Incentives “To Plan” Fall Short of Implementation . 259
2. From the “Big Dam” Era of Federal Flood Control
to Risk Management and the Grant to Gamble ........ 262 
3. Federal Water Quality Standards ............................. 267
B. California State Water Law: Appropriative Rights vs. 
Water Security ............................................................... 271 
III. State and Local Leadership in Climate Adaptation
Planning ................................................................................ 275 
A. Adaptation-Embeddedness for Water Resources in 
Municipal Climate Action Plans .................................... 279 
1. Methodology ............................................................ 279
2. Results ...................................................................... 281
254 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 34, 253 
B. A Municipal Climate Action Plan That “Sticks”: 
Advocating for a Water-Climate Element in the 
General Plan ................................................................... 282 
Conclusion ....................................................................................... 285 
INTRODUCTION 
ater-related natural disasters1 result in the loss of life, loss of 
property, and severe damage to the environment.2 In 
California, water resource administration is encumbered by 
temperamental hydrological conditions,3 complex interbasin transfer 
agreements,4 and over-appropriated watersheds.5 This is magnified by 
the current and future effects of climate change, which are “expected 
to exacerbate current stresses on water resources from population 
growth and economic and land-use change, including urbanisation.”6 
For example, climate projections forecast that the over-appropriated 
Colorado River,7 which is a major source of water for cities, 
agriculture, and hydroelectricity generation in California, will 
experience up to a twenty percent reduction in annual flows by 2057.8 
Further, seasonal extremes in the Sierra Nevada Mountains have also 
intensified. There, winter storms and rapid warming temperatures 
resulted in disastrous spring flood events and prolonged summer 
1 Water-Related Disasters, UNESCO, http://en.unesco.org/themes/water-security/ 
hydrology/water-related-disasters (last visited Nov. 13, 2018); The United Nations 
Environment Programme estimates that water-related hazards account for over 90% of 
natural hazards, globally. UNEP, What We Do: Addressing Water-Related Conflict and 
Disasters, https://www.unenvironment.org/explore-topics/water/what-we-do/addressing-
water-related-conflict-and-disasters (last visited Nov. 13, 2018). 
2 Patricia E. Salkin, Sustainability at the Edge: The Opportunity and Responsibility of 
Local Governments to Most Effectively Plan for Natural Disaster Mitigation, 38 ENVTL. L. 
REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10158, 10158 (2008). 
3 See generally JEFFREY F. MOUNT, CALIFORNIA RIVERS AND STREAMS: THE CONFLICT 
BETWEEN FLUVIAL PROCESS AND LAND USE 146–52 (1995) (describing complexities of 
California water management). 
4 See Robert W. Adler, Climate Change and the Hegemony of State Water Law, 29 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 23–25 (2010). 
5 Christine A. Klein, Water Bankruptcy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 560, 571 (2012). 
6 IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 49 (2007), https://www.ipcc.ch/ 
site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ar4_syr_full_report.pdf. 
7 See Adler, supra note 4, at 14–15. 
8 Balaji Rajagopalan et al., Water Supply Risk on the Colorado River: Can Management 
Mitigate?, 45 WATER RESOURCES RES. 1, 1 (2009). 
W 
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droughts for receiving waters, such as the San Joaquin River.9 These 
instances are a glance of hydrological sensitivity to climate change, 
which has led water research experts to conclude that “climate change 
is water change.”10 
The challenge of concurrently planning for water shortages, 
flooding, and sea level rise paired with increased supply pressure from 
population growth cannot be understated. And, certainly, the task is 
further complicated given the Trump administration’s and Congress’s 
absence of federal leadership on climate change.11 Many experts 
recognize that planning with this level of uncertainty12 in the era of 
climate change will be one of the most significant challenges to water 
resource management this century.13 Despite this uncertainty, the legal 
regimes and institutions governing water resources and flood 
management must respond in ways that are to address the range of 
inevitable impacts, beyond the “wait-and-see approach.”14 Indeed, 
local governments have demonstrated leadership through the adoption 
of binding and nonbinding climate plans, despite ambiguity and the 
tenuous position of the federal government on climate change. Thus, 
the goal of this Article is to advance climate planning literature by 
answering the following question:  
9 See John T. Andrew et al., California Water Management: Subject to Change, 14 
HASTINGS W. NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1463, 1464–66 (2008); Joseph Serna, Rivers 
Swollen from Melting Sierra Nevada Snowpack Claim Another Life in the Central Valley, 
L.A. TIMES (May 22, 2017, 9:40 A.M.), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-
central-valley-drowning-river-snowpack-20170522-story.html. 
10 Chelsea Harvey, Climate Change is Water Change—Why the Colorado River System 
Is Headed for Major Trouble, WASH. POST: ENERGY & ENV’T (Aug. 19, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/08/19/climate-
change-is-water-change-why-the-colorado-river-system-is-headed-for-
trouble/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5d8881e17cc1 (quoting Brad Udall, senior water and 
climate research scientist at Colorado Water Institute of Colorado State University). 
11 See generally Vicki Arroyo, State and Local Climate Leadership in the Trumpocene, 
4 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 303 (2017). 
12 “[A]lthough the exact nature and magnitude of changes in global water resources 
remains uncertain, there is a growing scientific consensus that those changes will be real 
and significant.” Adler, supra note 4, at 10. 
13 Michelle Bryan Mudd, A Next, Big Step for the West: Using Model Legislation to 
Create a Water-Climate Element in Local Comprehensive Plans, 3 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 1, 17–18 (2013); Andrew et al., supra note 9, at 1463; Thomas M. Gremillion, Setting 
the Foundation: Climate Change Adaptation at the Local Level, 41 ENVTL. L. 1221, 1226–
27 (2011). 
14 Adler, supra note 4, at 9–10. 
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Based on the assumption that clear legal objectives improve policy 
implementation,15 can cities overcome the obstacles of climate 
uncertainty and legal fragmentation16 in water resource adaptation 
planning by integrating local climate action plans into municipal 
general plans? 
This Article considers federal, state, and local climate-planning tools 
in the context of water resource adaptation in California and presents 
research on local climate action plans that identify two potential 
strategies for local governments to continue their demonstrated 
leadership in climate planning. Part I distinguishes climate mitigation 
and adaptation policies and discusses the need to move climate 
adaptation beyond a nominal role in climate planning. Part II provides 
a brief overview of the current water and climate regulatory regime at 
federal and state levels that affect water management in California. 
Finally, Part III distinguishes climate mitigation and adaptation 
policies and presents the methodological approach and results for an 
adaptation-embeddedness17 analysis of sixty-nine municipal climate 
action plans from California cities. Part III also proposes the solution 
of including the climate action plan as an element in California 
municipal general plans and addresses the obstacles and benefits that 
arise from comprehensively planning for water resources, hazards, and 
climate change in this manner. 
15 Paul A. Sabatier, Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Implementation 
Research: A Critical Analysis and Suggested Synthesis, 6 J. PUB. POL’Y 21, 23, 28–29 
(1986). 
16 According to Professor Mudd, legal fragmentation is prevalent in water resources and 
land use planning since water quality, quantity, and land use planning authority is dispersed 
across federal, state, and local actors, respectively. Mudd, supra note 13, at 7. An example 
of legal fragmentation in water resources adaptation planning is the Natural Hazard 
Vulnerability Assessments under the Disaster Management Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5165 (2000), 
which requires state, local, or tribal governments to submit a hazard mitigation plan “that 
outlines processes for identifying the natural hazards, risks, and vulnerabilities of the area 
under the jurisdiction of the government.” § 5165(a). However, these plans are rarely used 
by decision-making bodies in a land use planning or water management context, which are 
both run by separate local, regional, or state governing bodies. Mudd, supra note 13, at 24–
30. Sharing information and cross-agency communication is of tantamount importance for
the regulation of water, let alone developing climate adaptation measures for water quality, 
quantity, and hazards. Id. 
17 Adaptation-embeddedness is defined in this Article as the extent that the city 
accounted for the flooding, quality, quantity, and land use elements in planning to adapt to 
the impacts of climate change to water resources. For a general definition of embeddedness 
of adaptation to climate change see Frans Berkhout, Adaptation to Climate Change by 
Organizations, 3 WILEY INTERDISC. REV.: CLIMATE CHANGE 91, 92 (2012). 
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I 
BEYOND THE MITIGATION FRAMEWORK: RISING CHALLENGES 
AND THE CALL FOR CLIMATE ADAPTATION PLANNING 
Generally, climate change policy falls within two somewhat distinct 
planning approaches: mitigation and adaptation. The mitigation 
approach is rationalized through decades of climate science that links 
human activity to increased levels of heat-trapping greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere.18 Climate scientists have connected the increased 
concentration of greenhouse gases to the rise in global temperatures, 
which significantly impacts human health, safety, and welfare.19 Like 
all other sectors, planning for climate change mitigation in the water 
management context focuses on emissions reduction and atmospheric 
stabilization to reduce the catastrophic costs of climate change.20 
Similarly, adaptation seeks to reduce the societal costs of climate 
change but without an exclusive focus on emissions reduction.21 Here, 
adaptation includes a wide range of strategies to prepare communities 
by adjusting use and consumption behaviors or by improving 
infrastructure to absorb and adapt to water-related hazards.22 To be 
clear, mitigation and adaptation strategies are not mutually exclusive; 
often, strategies are designed to yield cobenefits from 
implementation.23 For example, a reduction in domestic water use 
18 Mostly connected through the extraction, use, and reliance of fossil fuels. U.S. 
GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 13 (2009), https://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/Global.pdf 
[hereinafter Global Impacts]; see Roger A. Pielke, Rethinking the Role of Adaptation in 
Climate Policy, 8 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 159, 161–62 (1998). 
19 Global Impacts, supra note 18, at 13; Climate Impacts on Human Health, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climate-impacts/climate-
impacts-human-health.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2018). 
20 Pielke, supra note 18, at 162–63. 
21 European Commission, Adaptation to Climate Change, EU: CLIMATE ACTION, 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/adaptation_en (last visited Nov. 16, 2018) (climate 
“[a]daptation means anticipating the adverse effects of climate change and taking 
appropriate action to prevent or minimise the damage they can cause, or taking advantage 
of opportunities that may arise. It has been shown that well planned, early adaptation action 
saves money and lives later.”); Gremillion, supra note 13, at 1227–28. 
22 Adler, supra note 4, at 8–10. 
23 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3 ¶ 3, May 9, 
1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC] (addressing 
the need to cooperatively manage for climate mitigation and adaptation). Note, too, that the 
opposite is true: adaptation and mitigation measures can exacerbate the ills of climate 
change if not cooperatively managed. For example, coastal desalination plants require an 
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lowers emissions from water conveyance infrastructure by requiring 
less energy for fewer water deliveries, and it is a long-term response to 
water resource shortages by reducing demand for consumption.24  
Despite the need to address mitigation and adaptation in tandem25 
and the call by experts to respond to climate change disturbances that 
have “push[ed] the hydroclimate beyond the range of historic trends, 
and beyond the ability of existing water resources infrastructure to 
cope,”26 adaptation continues to only receive an “honorable mention” 
in most climate policy documents. This approach is often due to 
complex legal expertise and spatial fragmentation issues that arise from 
the cooperative management of water resources for adaptation.27 Thus, 
a major challenge for climate policy is to enhance governing strategies 
that comprehensively address adaptation, from risks of natural hazards 
to impacts in water quality.28  
II 
FEDERAL AND STATE WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A 
COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
This Article argues that there are immediate, low-cost opportunities 
for water resources adaptation that can be realized by municipal 
integration of nonregulatory climate action plans within compulsory 
general plans. To reach this conclusion, a critical look at existing 
federal and state water resources management is necessary. Water 
resources management is a fragmented enterprise, since “water quality 
regulation is largely federal, water quantity regulation is largely state, 
and land use planning is largely local.”29 A closer look reveals that legal 
energy-intensive process to generate clean water, which may result in increased emissions 
to secure a drinkable water supply. HEATHER COOLEY & MATTHEW HEBERGER, KEY 
ISSUES FOR SEAWATER DESALINATION IN CALIFORNIA: ENERGY AND GREENHOUSE 
EMISSIONS 4–5 (2013), http://pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/desal-energy-ghg-
full-report.pdf.  
24 See, e.g., CITY OF COLTON, CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 4-21 to -22 (2015) (identifying 
strategies for water consumption reductions as a way to reduce electricity use and resulting 
emissions from water conveyance infrastructure). 
25 UNFCCC, supra note 23. 
26 Adler, supra note 4, at 9. 
27 Mudd, supra note 13, at 7–8. 
28 See Chris Koski & Alma Siulagi, Environmental Harm or Natural Hazard? Problem 
Identification and Adaptation in U.S. Municipal Climate Action Plans, 33 REV. POL’Y RES. 
270, 273 (2016). 
29 Mudd, supra note 13, at 7; Craig Anthony Arnold, Introduction: Integrating Water 
Controls and Land Use Controls: New Ideas and Old Obstacles, in WET GROWTH: SHOULD 
WATER LAW CONTROL LAND USE? 1, 34 (Craig Anthony Arnold ed., 2005). 
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fragmentation is also present within the federal level, since federal 
water statutes generally focus on a single subject, that is, either flood 
management or water quality management. This legal fragmentation 
results in little regulatory overlap between these subjects and 
complicates planning for water as a connected, integrated resource.  
Section A examines several federal statutes and state regulations that 
impact flood disaster management, water quality, and water quantity 
planning. Section A.1 focuses on federal disaster mitigation planning 
mandates that require state and local governments to mitigate potential 
hazards through the Disaster Mitigation Act (DMA) of 2000. The DMA 
is the major federal program that requires state, tribal, and local 
governments to coordinate and identify natural hazard mitigation 
measures but fails to require state and local governments to implement 
legally binding natural hazard mitigation measures. Next, Section A.2 
addresses the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) 
National Flood Insurance Program’s 100-year floodplain provision and 
the grant of federal subsidies to developments and redevelopments 
within the floodplain. Then, in Section A.3 federal statutes affecting 
water quality regulation are discussed. The takeaway from this inquiry 
is the need for a resolution for federal fragmentation and a more 
integrative federal role of water law and policy. Finally, Section B 
discusses the state’s role in managing water quantity and examines the 
artificial distinction between water quantity and water quality 
management.  
A. Federal Flood and Water Quality Management 
1. Compulsory Hazard Mitigation Planning Under the Disaster
Management Act: Why Financial Incentives “To Plan” Fall 
Short of Implementation 
The DMA is the regulatory catalyst for hazard mitigation30 planning 
at the federal level. The goal of the DMA is to establish “a [national] 
program for predisaster mitigation, [and] to streamline the 
administration of disaster relief[.]”31 This is accomplished by a 
combination of “carrots” (federal financial support for disaster relief) 
30 “Hazard mitigation” is defined as “sustained action taken to reduce or eliminate the 
long-term risk to human life and property from hazards.” 44 C.F.R. § 201.2 (2015).  
31 Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-390, 114 Stat. 1552 (2000) (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5208). 
260 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 34, 253 
and “sticks” (restrictions on eligibility for certain funding streams).32 
In action, § 322 of the DMA requires state governments to develop 
mitigation plans that meet DMA criteria standards to be eligible for 
financing post-disaster projects under FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation 
Grant Program (HMGP).33 Similarly, local governments are required 
to participate in state plans to receive hazard mitigation project funding 
for infrastructural improvements.34  
The state mitigation plan is the primary implementation strategy for 
achieving a nationally coordinated natural disaster plan. There are five 
elements to every state mitigation plan:  
(1) Documentation and description of the planning process;35  
(2) A hazard risk assessment;  
(3) Mitigation strategies for reducing current and future risks;  
(4) A plan maintenance and implementation methodology (to be 
reviewed every five years); and 
(5) A coordination strategy to involve state and local agencies, 
community stakeholders, and the public36 in the planning 
process.37  
Using these minimum criteria, states develop a mitigation strategy that 
provides a “blueprint for reducing the losses identified in the risk 
assessment,”38 a list of state goals, and mitigation action items that the 
state is considering. 
State mitigation plans are broken down further into two tiers of 
plans: (1) the standard mitigation plan and (2) the enhanced state 
mitigation plan. The standard state mitigation plan requires states to 
address each of the five planning elements, listed above, to be eligible 
for post-disaster relief funding up to 7.5% of the total eligible disaster 
assistance funds available per fiscal year.39 By contrast, the enhanced 
state mitigation plan expands these requirements by instructing the 
state to, among other things, demonstrate “that the plan is integrated to 
32 Anna K. Schwab & David J. Brower, Increasing Resilience to Natural Hazards: 
Obstacles and Opportunities for Local Governments Under the Disaster Mitigation Act of 
2000, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS, 10171, 10181 (2008). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, MULTI-HAZARD MITIGATION PLANNING 
GUIDANCE UNDER THE DISASTER MITIGATION ACT OF 2000 (2008). 
36 44 C.F.R. § 201.4(b) (2017). 
37 Salkin, supra note 2, at 10161. 
38 44 C.F.R. § 201.4(c)(3). 
39 Salkin, supra note 2, at 10160–61. 
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the extent practicable with other State and/or regional planning 
initiatives ([i.e.] comprehensive, growth management, economic 
development, capital improvement, land development, and/or 
emergency plans). . . .”40 Fulfilling the expanded criteria of the 
enhanced state mitigation plan allows the state to be eligible for up to 
20% of disaster assistance funds available, thus incentivizing state 
proactivity in pre-event hazard mitigation via risk integration into 
planning policy.41 
Although the DMA outlines a comprehensive approach for assessing 
hazard risk and crafting a localized mitigation plan, a major criticism 
of the DMA is that it fails to compel states to actually implement 
mitigation actions.42 This is exemplified by the statutory construction 
of the DMA, which prompts local governments to produce a mitigation 
plan for submission and approval by the state and FEMA regional 
offices to be eligible for federal disaster assistance and HMGP funds 
but does not require local governments to do anything more than 
describe and list their proposed implementation methodology.43 
Nowhere in the DMA is there a mandate for local governments to 
pursue and apply implementation actions for natural disaster 
mitigation. Thus, implementing enforceable disaster mitigation 
planning regulations remains an entirely voluntary function of local 
governments. 
Another shortcoming of the DMA is that it is largely aimed at federal 
emergency management, rather than local planning.44 In practice, a 
large number of local plans submitted to FEMA under the DMA are 
simply “glorified emergency operation plans.”45 Generally, these 
emergency operation plans address a community’s emergency 
preparedness, response, and recovery, rather than pre-event disaster 
mitigation actions that limit exposure of people and property to disaster 
risks.46 The almost exclusive focus on emergency management 
overshadows a planning approach that integrates water resources, land 
use management, and development pattern strategies. Local planners 
40 44 C.F.R. § 201.5(b)(1) (2017). 
41 Salkin, supra note 2, at 10161. 
42 Schwab & Brower, supra note 32, at 10182. 
43 Id. at 10182–83. 
44 Id. at 10184. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
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have indispensable insight to formulate mitigation strategies that 
reduce local vulnerability by regulating land uses and regulating future 
growth, which are often recognized by other federal programs.47 But by 
concentrating on emergency preparedness alone, the DMA misses the 
opportunity to require local land-use and development policy to target 
disaster mitigation through local regulatory enforcement tools. 
2. From the “Big Dam” Era of Federal Flood Control to Risk
Management and the Grant to Gamble 
In the past two hundred years, U.S. flood control policies have 
matured through several governance iterations.48 In the nineteenth 
century, state and local governments were primarily responsible for 
living up to the societal expectation that government would provide 
“maximum protection” from floods. Early flood adaptation approaches 
of siting structures on “higher ground” was followed until the mid-
nineteenth century, after a period of rapid population growth that forced 
residents to develop structures within flood-prone areas.49 At that time, 
state and local governments began investing in hard structural defenses 
to flooding, such as dams and levees, to protect communities from 
disastrous flood events.50 By 1936, the federal government usurped 
flood control from local and state government through a series of flood 
control legislation.51 The Flood Control Act of 1936 (1936 Act) 
authorized the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACOE) to erect 
engineered structures for flood solutions to improve waterways52 and 
favored a shift from structural defense systems to the building of dams 
for floodwater retention.53 It is estimated that the USACOE currently 
47 FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, INTEGRATING HAZARD MITIGATION INTO 
LOCAL PLANNING: CASE STUDIES AND TOOLS FOR COMMUNITY OFFICIALS 1-1, 1-2 
(2013), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1908-25045-0016/integrating 
_hazmit.pdf. 
48 See Debbie M. Chizewer & A. Dan Tarlock, New Challenges for Urban Areas Facing 
Flood Risks, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1739, 1741 (2013). 
49 A. Dan Tarlock, United States Flood Control Policy: The Incomplete Transition from 
the Illusion of Total Protection to Risk Management, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 151, 
156 (2012). 
50 Jacob Park & Christopher Brooks, Local Flood Resiliency in an Era of Global Climate 
Change: Understanding the Multi-Sectoral Policy Dimensions, 17 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 160, 
165 (2015). 
51 Id. 
52 Flood Control Act of 1936, ch. 688, 49 Stat. 1570 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 701–709c (2017)). 
53 Park & Brooks, supra note 50, at 166. 
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operates more than six hundred flood control dams across the nation.54 
Under the 1936 Act, structural engineering projects require the 
USACOE to complete watershed studies for the impact of building 
structural projects but fails to require the agency to consider the 
projects’ potential impacts to the broader watershed.55 This paradox 
highlights the primary concern of the 1936 Act, which is to site and 
design “discrete projects based on careful cost-benefit analysis, rather 
than on broad based and integrated planning for an entire basin.”56 
Although the USACOE has shifted away from the emphasis on hard 
structural defenses and retention systems, federal funding issues and 
aging infrastructure continue to present significant obstacles to its flood 
control management efforts.57 
Recognizing that structural flood control was a costly and 
insufficient enterprise, in 1968 Congress adopted the National Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP).58 The NFIP offered federally subsidized 
flood insurance to residents in municipalities that have adopted land-
use controls, which limit development in floodplains59 and flood-prone 
areas.60 Today, the NFIP drives the design and implementation of 
floodplain regulation in general plans. In California, where decades of 
active urban sprawl resulted in the urbanization of floodplains and 
flood-prone areas, the NFIP directs local communities to develop and 
apply measures that prohibit development in the 100-year floodplain 
and requires owners of nonconforming structures to purchase federal 
54 Id. (citing NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES CHALLENGES 
FACING THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 8 (2011)). 
55 Id. at 166–67. 
56 Id. at 167. 
57 A. Dan Tarlock & Deborah M. Chizewer, Living with Water in a Climate-Changed 
World: Will Federal Flood Policy Sink or Swim? 46 ENVTL. L. 491, 503 (2016). 
58 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4001–33 (West 2012). 
59 See Dep’t of Reg’l Dev. & Env’t Exec. Secretariat for Econ. & Soc. Affairs Org. of 
Am. States, Primer on Natural Hazard Management in Integrated Regional Development 
Plan, pt. III, ch. 8, sec. A, sec. 1 (1991), http://fnad.org/Documentos/Primer%20on%20 
Natural%20Hazard%20Management%20in%20Integrated%20Regional%20Development
%20Planning.pdf (last updated Sept. 14, 2013) (“Floodplains are, in general, those lands 
most subject to recurring floods, situated adjacent to rivers and streams. Floodplains are 
therefore ‘flood-prone’ and are hazardous to development activities if the vulnerability of 
those activities exceeds an acceptable level.”).
60 Tarlock & Chizewer, supra note 57, at 505–06. 
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flood insurance.61 This program results in disaster avoidance, which 
reduces long-term repair or redevelopment costs associated with 
“disastrous” flood events through regulatory and market incentives.62 
But, according to many experts, the program “was flawed from the 
start, and its problems have progressively worsened.”63 
First, the program is backlogged in the production of accurate, 
updated Flood Insurance Rate Maps (flood maps).64 Flood maps are 
integral to effective floodplain management since they determine 
whether property owners are situated near or within the 100-year 
floodplain65 and thus, whether they require flood insurance. The maps 
consist of topographical and property ownership (tax lots) surveys and 
include factors such as slope, precipitation, hydraulic, and fluvial 
geomorphic analysis to the floodplain and its interaction with 
surrounding properties.66 Second, the accuracy of old flood maps and 
new,67 more technologically advanced ones are routinely challenged by 
local government agencies, which results in denials of flood map 
amendment proposals.68 Finally, serious questions arise regarding the 
usefulness of the maps, many of which do not consider the impacts of 
climate change, such as sea levels or changes in precipitation events.69 
61 MOUNT, supra note 3, at 268–69; see also Local Flood Protection Act, CAL. WATER 
CODE §§ 8200–8201 (West 2009) (providing the voluntary procedure and provisions for a 
local government agency to prepare a local plan of flood protection). 
62 MOUNT, supra note 3, at 268–69. 
63 A. Dan Tarlock, United States Flood Control Policy: The Incomplete Transition from 
the Illusion of Total Protection to Risk Management, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 151, 
168 (2012). 
64 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., TYING FLOOD INSURANCE TO 
FLOOD RISK FOR LOW-LYING STRUCTURES IN THE FLOODPLAIN 17 (2015). 
65 “In written testimony to Congress, FEMA administrator Craig Fugate indicated that 
the ‘in or out’ nature of [flood maps] creates a credibility problem.” Tarlock & Chizewer, 
supra note 57, at 506 n.87 (citing Examining the Reauthorization of the National Flood 
Insurance Program Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 
112 Cong. 43 (2011)). 
66 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-29-297R, OVERVIEW OF GAO’S 
PAST WORK ON THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 28, 30 (2014), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/662438.pdf. 
67 “New” technologies include 3-D mapping data from Light Detection and Ranging 
(LIDAR) instruments. Tarlock & Chizewer, supra note 57, at 507. These technical 
improvements are limited by the cost of running the mapping instruments but improve 
mapping accuracy where used. Id. at 507–08. 
68 See id. at 508 (stating that “complaints continue to emerge regarding the accuracy of 
the new maps with 89% of the 30,000 flood map amendment requests proving successful”). 
69 GAO-14-29-297R, supra note 66. 
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But what is the 100-year floodplain, and why does this “line in the 
sand”70 influence billions of dollars of development and infrastructure 
investments? The 10-year, 50-year, and 100-year flood concepts are 
based on the statistical estimation of the probability that instream 
conditions will equal or exceed the average daily discharge in a given 
year either in peak flow conditions or by volume of flow over several 
days. This concept is referred to as the exceedance probability (P) and 
is used to calculate the recurrence interval (T)71 of a flow condition.72 
For the 100-year flood, there is a 0.01 exceedance probability or 100% 
(P = 1/0.01) recurrence interval for the 100-year flood in any one 
hundred year period, based on the probability of that volume of 
discharge for a given waterway. This probability does not mean that 
the 100-year flood will punctually occur every one hundred years. 
Rather, the recurrence interval concludes that the 100-year flood 
volume will occur every one hundred years with a 1% probability of 
occurring every year. Simply put, over the course of ten thousand years, 
the one hundred year volume of discharge (one hundred year 
recurrence interval) will occur one hundred times in any watercourse. 
Notwithstanding the fact that these one hundred year flows could be 
evenly distributed across ten thousand years or all occur within the first 
one hundred years, the exceedance probability and recurrence interval 
stay the same.  
As explained above, the recurrence interval is not really a predictor 
of the interval between flow volumes but a way to express the 
likelihood that a flow volume will occur over a period of time. Viewed 
alone, the recurrence interval perpetuates the myth that the 100-year 
flood will likely occur within the next one hundred years, but that it is 
not a certainty. This myth preserves a false sense of sound reasoning: 
since there is low probability (1%) that a 100-year flood will occur in 
any year, it is economically feasible for public and private developers 
to pursue projects within or abutting the 100-year floodplain because 
the cost to avoid the flood risk is low.73 However, this approach fails to 
70 MOUNT, supra note 3, at 269. 
71 The recurrence interval is expressed as 1/P or T. RO CHARLTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
FLUVIAL GEOMORPHOLOGY 31 (2008). 
72 Id. at 31–32. 
73 In analyzing the risk of flood to a specific location, other characteristics are considered 
such as “flood zone designation, elevation of the property relative to the community’s base 
flood elevation . . . , building type, number of floors, presence of a basement, and the year a 
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include an accumulation of probability over a number of years that the 
100-year flood will occur. That is, over a longer period of time, every 
year that the 100-year flow volume does not occur, the likelihood that 
it will occur next year increases. The accumulation of probability is 
expressed by the calculation: 
P = 1− [1−1/T]n.74 
Consider this simple example: a buyer purchases residential 
property in the 100-year floodplain and lives there for twenty years; the 
probability that the property will be flooded in any one year is 1% (0.01 
= P). This increases to a 20% probability (0.01 × 20 years) for the 
twenty-year period. Thus, there is a one-in-five chance that the property 
located in the 100-year floodplain will flood during the course of 
ownership. These odds, when viewed as an accumulation of risk, still 
may be favorable enough for some owners to develop property in the 
100-year flood plain. And when coupled with the NFIP’s flood 
insurance plans, the risk of loss to owners is further mitigated by the 
program’s provision of federal subsidies for development and 
redevelopment after disastrous floods in floodplains.  
Behind the statistical application of flood frequency there is the 
changing and evolving river itself. Data on instream flow and flow 
frequencies (e.g., collected by U.S. Geological Survey stage recorders) 
are used to estimate peak discharge of the 100-year flood event and can 
be expressed as a frequency curve.75 The frequency curve reflects the 
distribution of discharge values fitted to the discharge volume’s 
exceedance probability.76 Researchers in California have found that an 
exceptionally large discharge volume impacts the frequency curve by 
increasing the slope of the curve, which in turn results in a greater 
discharge estimate for the 100-year event.77 Following this data, 
researchers concluded that greater discharge estimates for the 100-year 
flood lead to an expansion of the 100-year floodplain.  
The inverse of the scenario can also occur. Where smaller (over a 
greater period of time) annual peak discharges are recorded and plotted 
on the frequency curve, the slope of the curve can decrease, thereby 
structure was built relative to the year of a community’s original flood map.” GAO-14-29-
297R, supra note 66, at 16. 
74 Where n is the number of years. MOUNT, supra note 3, at 273. 
75 Id. at 275–79; RO CHARLTON, supra note 71, at 32–34. 
76 RO CHARLTON, supra note 71, at 32–34. 
77 MOUNT, supra note 3, at 278–79. 
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decreasing the area of the plotted watercourse’s floodplain.78 The 
frequency curve is one method of data analysis used to calculate 
floodplain boundaries and is exampled here to demonstrate the “fluid 
nature of the line in the sand”79 of defining the 100-year floodplain, 
even at the analytical level of data collection and synthesis. 
Hydrologists continue to refine these methods but are ultimately at the 
behest of the administrative review process of local governments who 
ultimately adopt the hard boundary of each level of floodplain.  
Many hydrologists bemoan the fact that the 100-year floodplain is 
an arbitrary measurement that creates a false sense of security in land-
use planning decisions.80 Professor Jeffery Mount argues that the 
implicit conclusion that those homes located ten feet inside the 100-
year floodplain are safer than those located ten feet outside the 
designation is scientifically untenable—though perhaps politically 
defensible.81 This is because flood magnitudes form a continuum of 
hydrographic conditions with no “natural break at the 100-year flood 
mark.”82 Yet political and administrative feasibility of programming 
such a “hard line” into flood and disaster management continues to 
make the option of adopting the 100-year floodplain standard an 
attractive policy. FEMA, the Army Corps of Engineers, and state 
disaster management agencies continue to rely on the 100-year flood 
concepts explained above to manage and reduce risks of flooding, even 
when there is virtually no certainty that the 100-year floodplain defined 
by these concepts is accurately defined.83 
3. Federal Water Quality Standards
There is no doubt that federal water quality regulations are effective
in driving water resources management and land-use planning 
decisions.84 However, questions remain regarding the extent of state 
authority in managing instream flow requirements and water diversions 
78 See id. at 277–78 (acknowledging that smaller peak discharges can influence a 
watercourse’s frequency curve but do not have the same effectiveness in shifting the curve 
as a large flooding event). 
79 Id. at 277. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 281. 
84 Arnold, supra note 29, at 15–16. 
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under state water law when such authority conflicts with federal 
standards. Here, two federal statutes, the Clean Water Act (CWA) and 
the Endangered Species Act (ESA) are analyzed, in turn.  
First, the EPA is responsible for administering and enforcing state 
compliance with federal mandates for surface water quality standards 
under the CWA.85 Under the CWA, the EPA establishes minimum 
treatment standards for some types of pollution.86 Then, under a 
cooperative federalism structure, states are granted the authority to 
“establish goals for ambient water quality, implement the [CWA’s] 
permitting programs, develop . . . comprehensive planning and 
nonpoint source pollution programs, and certify whether federally 
licensed or permitted projects will comply with state requirements.”87  
While the cooperative federalism model has, historically, resulted in 
Congress’s deference to state water law in the CWA,88 it is less certain 
which law controls when the two legal regimes conflict. When 
confronted with this issue, the Supreme Court found that there is an 
“artificial distinction” between water quality and water quantity and 
upheld the state water law’s authority to manage instream flow 
standards for federally licensed projects under section 401 of the 
CWA.89 Scholars have also noted that it is unclear how the law will 
respond to the opposite scenario, where changes in permitting or 
hydrological conditions increase water distributions under state law in 
a manner that affects compliance with or attainment of the CWA and 
its goals.90  
This uncertainty will likely become more prevalent as climate 
change impacts hydrological regimes. The uncertainty is particularly 
prevalent in California, where water scarcity is driving state water 
managers to secure new water resources, and users seek to enforce 
water allocation rights. For example, enforcing deliveries on depleting 
streams may result in issues of compliance with the CWA or may 
85 Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251–1387 (West 2017). 
86 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1311(b)–(c), 1314(b) (West 2018). 
87 Adler, supra note 4, at 27 (citing CWA’s statutes that oversee cooperative federalism 
with state water quality standards 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288, 1313(c), 1319, 1341, 1342(b), 
1344(g)–(l)). 
88 §§ 1251(e), (g) (acknowledging the primary responsibilities and rights of states in 
managing water resources). 
89 PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 719 (1994). 
90 Adler, supra note 4, at 27–28. See generally Reed D. Benson, Pollution Without 
Solution: Flow Impairment Problems Under the Clean Water Act Section 303, 24 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 199 (2005). 
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impact sensitive species that inhabit the aquatic environment. In this 
light, water quality is not exclusively managed under the CWA but also 
implicates the ESA, where protected species are present in aquatic 
environments facing critical environmental challenges.  
The ESA is referred to by many scholars as the “federal land use 
planning tool,” which imposes restrictions upon land use and 
development where, in the case of water, endangered aquatic or 
aquatic-dependent species are present in a given location.91 In addition, 
the authority of the statute over state water law appears to be growing, 
as captured in the 2013 decision of the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas,92 which announced that “the [Act] preempts 
state water law and the exercise of state water rights.”93 Similarly, in 
the 2007 National Resource Defense Council v. Kempthorne decision, 
the Eastern District of California found that in promulgating a 
biological opinion on the impact of water pumping on the “threatened” 
listed Delta Smelt fish species, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service had 
not used the best available science since it failed to include the impacts 
of climate change to the Sacramento–San Joaquin River Delta (Bay 
Delta).94 The decision drove the California Department of Water 
Resources to reconsider water deliveries for the U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation’s Central Valley Project and California’s State Water 
Project in the Bay Delta and to announce that it would reduce pumping 
operations to abate jeopardizing the threatened species.95 The recipients 
of water deliveries from the Bay Delta were farmers who since 2007 
had coped with drought and water rationing by altering the agricultural 
use of their farmland and making investments in water-efficient 
irrigation systems. The shortages spurred by the decision in 
Kempthorne have “helped to force water rationing throughout 
California”96 and consequently impacted the use and development of 
land by severely limiting water availability under the ESA. However, 
primarily relying on litigation to manage water resources and 
91 Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2018); Arnold, 
supra note 29 at 37–38. 
92 Ark. Project v. Shaw, 930 F. Supp. 2d 716 (S.D. Tex. 2013). 
93 Robin Kundis Craig, Does the Endangered Species Act Preempt State Water Law?, 
62 KAN. L. REV. 851, 851 (2014). 
94 Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 388 (E.D. Cal. 2007). 
95 ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CONTEXT: CASES AND MATERIALS 
414 (3d ed. 2012). 
96 Craig, supra note 93, at 869. 
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environmental quality is largely a reactionary technique, and litigation 
often fails to provide a prophylactic approach to adaptation and 
preparedness that can be achieved through climate adaptation 
planning.97  
While it is important to continue the effort in enforcing federal 
statutes that give weight to responsible natural resource conservation, 
it is ultimately a misplaced hope that federal actions alone can 
accomplish the dual goals of local land use planning: economic 
development and environmental health. It is clear that, under the Trump 
administration, climate adaptation planning, from emergency 
management to environmental quality, is left to the states and local 
communities.98 While financial and political resources are still 
available in some capacity from federal programming, cities must be 
proactive in securing such resources.99 Thus, it is within the interest of 
state and local governments to cooperatively progress. 
97 However, there has been significant development in atmospheric trust litigation to use 
the judicial system as a prophylactic conduit for climate planning. See Mary Christina Wood 
& Charles W. Woodward, IV, Atmospheric Trust Litigation and the Constitutional Right to 
a Healthy Climate System: Judicial Recognition at Last, 6 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
633, 669–73 (explaining the procedural history and holding of Foster v. Washington Dep’t 
of Ecology, which required the State of Washington to develop administrative policy for 
carbon abatement under the public trust doctrine). However, the problem of justiciability for 
future injuries incurred by climate change (e.g., sea-level rise and extreme weather events) 
remains to be a significant challenge in climate change litigation. UNITED NATIONS 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME, THE STATUS OF CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: A 
GLOBAL REVIEW 28 (2017), http://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/ 
20767/climate-change-litigation.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (discussing justiciability 
challenges to standing for climate change litigation such that “it may be difficult for an 
individual plaintiff to establish an adequate causal connection between a defendant’s 
allegedly unlawful actions or inaction and an injury that is linked to climate change 
impacts”). 
98 Eric Lipton & Hiroko Tabuchi, Driven by Trump Policy Changes, Fracking Booms 
on Public Lands, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/27/ 
climate/trump-fracking-drilling-oil-gas.html; Lisa Friedman, Trump Administration 
Formally Rolls Back Rule Aimed at Limiting Methane Pollution, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/18/climate/trump-methane-rollback.html; Brady 
Dennis et al., With a Shrinking EPA, Trump Delivers on His Promise to Cut Government, 
WASH. POST: HEALTH & SCIENCE (Sept. 8, 2018); Brady Dennis, Trump Budget Seeks 23 
Percent Cut at EPA, Eliminating Dozens of Programs, WASH. POST: HEALTH & SCIENCE 
(Feb. 12, 2018). 
99 As of the time of this writing, the U.S. EPA is still engaged in an interagency 
partnership for disaster mitigation and environmental quality management with the 
Department of Homeland Security. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY/FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 
(DHS/FEMA) AND THE U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA) 3 (2010), https://www. 
fema.gov/media-library-data/1471967433163-e3898bc1d162ebedd50eaa57a8e672d2/ 
MemorandumofAgreementBetweenFEMAandEPA_508_8.9.16.pdf. In addition, the EPA 
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B. California State Water Law: Appropriative Rights vs. Water 
Security 
This Section provides a brief look at the legal regime of prior 
appropriation in California state water law, its role in comprehensive 
water resources management, and the shortcomings of prior 
appropriation to respond to climate change and water scarcity. For 
many years, California courts oscillated between application of the 
natural flow doctrine100 of the riparian rights system101 and the 
reasonable and beneficial use doctrine102 of the prior appropriation 
system to water disputes.103 By the early twentieth century, upstream 
users worried that the natural flow doctrine would block access to water 
for upstream communities and agricultural projects, prevent the 
construction of dams and reservoirs, and monopolize the use of water 
resources by downstream users.104 In June 1976, California voters 
amended the California Constitution to formally adopt the reasonable 
use doctrine105 and discontinued the application of riparianism to new 
continues to allocate funding for local communities to address issues of local environmental 
justice. EPA Announces Availability of $1.5 Million in Environmental Justice Small 
Grants, U.S. EPA: News Released (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/ 
epa-announces-availability-15-million-environmental-justice-small-grants. 
100 See Costello v. Bowen, 182 P.2d 615, 621–22 (1947) “[A land owner] may not 
obstruct a natural channel . . . or otherwise change the natural discharge of such waters to 
the injury of his neighbors. . . . [W]hat constitutes the natural flow . . . is to be determined 
by natural conditions, unaffected by artificial changes”) (quoting 26 Cal. Jur. 284 § 496). 
101 Adler, supra note 4, at 18 (defining riparian rights as “a system of property rights in 
which only riparian (waterside) land owners had the right to withdraw and use water from a 
stream or other water body . . . based on a concept of ‘no harm,’ meaning that riparian 
landowners could use water so long as they did not substantially impair either the quantity 
or quality of water for downstream users.”). 
102 Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 491 (1935) (stating that “[t]he right to the 
use of water is limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for [a] beneficial use to 
be served. . . .[S]uch right does not . . . extend to the waste of water . . . [nor] to unreasonable 
use or unreasonable method of use or unreasonable method of diversion of water.”) The 
reasonable use doctrine remained valid following the California Constitution’s Article X 
amendment in 1976. See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 605 P.2d 1, 6 
(Cal. 1980); see also Nat. Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 717 (Cal. 1983); 
see also City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 864 (Cal. 2000). 
103 A. Dan Tarlock, We Are All Water Lawyers Now: Water Law’s Potential but Limited 
Impact on Urban Growth Management, WET GROWTH 75 (Craig Anthony Arnold ed., 
2005) [hereinafter We Are All Water Lawyers]. 
104 Id.  
105 CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2. 
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riparian owners, while old riparian rights were “grandfathered in.”106 
As a staple of the prior appropriation system, the reasonable use 
doctrine provided needed flexibility for the use and storage of water, 
since supplies of water could be appropriated outside of originating 
watersheds.107 Today, the State Water Resources Control Board108 and 
Department of Water Resources109 conjunctively manage the waters of 
the state of California, under the state water code. 
In contrast to the riparian rights system that attaches water rights to 
ownership in land, whether or not water is used, appropriative rights 
are “usufructuary” in kind. 110 In the prior appropriation system, the 
public owns the waters of the state, rather than private land owners.111 
Individuals can appropriate the conditional right to use water under a 
permitting system from the state.112 Conditional individual rights to 
appropriate water followed the “use it or lose it” rule; that is, the right 
to water was subject to forfeiture if not used in compliance with the 
terms of the permit.113 This condition aimed to reduce the “waste” of 
water and, until recently, was framed by the limitation that “beneficial 
uses” of instream flow rights were limited to economic purposes (e.g., 
mining, irrigation, domestic consumption, and hydroelectric 
generation).114 Today, “beneficial use” includes water rights for 
wildlife habitat, recreation, and aesthetics.115 Such instream flow rights 
are a useful environmental planning tool, since they can safeguard 
minimum water quantity levels, even in times of drought, for sensitive 
aquatic species and habitats.116 However, while the definition of 
“waste” includes requirements for efficiency, “there is a strong 
106 See BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 200–12 (5th ed. 2013) (providing for an extensive review of 
California’s transition from riparianism to prior appropriation of water rights). 
107 We Are All Water Lawyers, supra note 103. 
108 CAL. WATER CODE § 174 (West 2014). 
109 CAL. WATER CODE §§ 120–147.5 (West 2012).  
110 The term “usufructuary” is defined as a water right that grants an individual permit 
holder the right to use water. Gary W. Sawyers, A Primer on California Water Rights, UC 
DAVIS: AGRIC. ISSUES CTR. 10, http://aic.ucdavis.edu/events/outlook05/Sawyer_primer.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2018); Adler, supra note 4, at 22. 
111 Adler, supra note 4, at 22. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id.; CRAIG BELL & JEFF TAYLOR, WATER LAWS AND POLICIES FOR A SUSTAINABLE 
FUTURE: A WESTERN STATES’ PERSPECTIVE 174–75 (2008). 
115 BELL & TAYLOR, supra note 114, at 175. 
116 Id. at 174. 
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incentive to use all of one’s water right so as to not lose it, and rules 
against inefficient use are rarely enforced.”117 
Recent changes to climate and hydrological conditions, 118 over 
appropriation of water resources, and inefficient use of water has 
resulted in water shortages across California. These shortages have 
driven state and local governments to respond creatively. For example, 
in Southern California, local governments negotiated with senior water 
users from agricultural areas to update diversion and use infrastructure 
to improve water efficiency by paying those users to make such 
improvements.119 The right to those waters saved by this transaction 
was transferred to participating Californian cities.120 In this context, 
water transfers have the potential to free otherwise frozen, potentially 
low-value water uses (e.g., inefficient irrigation) to other, higher-value 
uses (e.g., domestic water supply).121 However, the complexity of 
appropriative water transfer prevents this option from being an 
economically and legally attractive solution for most communities.122 
Specifically, these transfers are encumbered by complex relationships 
between the petitioner for the transfer and other legal users’ rights to 
use water from a particular source. For example, during the transfer 
process, other legal users may formally challenge the water right 
involved in the transfer. 123 In addition, the transfer process requires the 
petitioner to assess whether “fish and wildlife would be affected by the 
change” and include “a statement of any measures proposed to be taken 
117 Adler, supra note 4, at 22. 
118 Emma L. Tompkins & W. Neil Adger, Does Adaptive Management of Natural 
Resources Enhance Resilience to Climate Change?, 9 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 2, 10–23 (2004). 
119 Id. at 23. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 25. 
122 Id. 
123 Approval for a water transfer requires a finding by the Department of Water 
Resources that the transfer will result in “no injury” to other legal users of that water system. 
State Water Res. Control Board Cases, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 189, 251 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). Other 
legal users (senior and junior water right holders) have standing to challenge the 
department’s “no injury” determination. CAL. WATER CODE § 1707(a)(1) (West 2000). In 
finding “no injury,” the agency must consider several factors, including records from the 
seller to support the historic use of their water right. CAL. WATER CODE § 1703.6(c)(3) 
(West 2011). These records for historic use rely only on diversion measurements, which 
until recently were not required, since it was assumed that the water user was in compliance 
with the parameters of their permit. CAL. WATER CODE § 917(a) (West 2018) (requiring 
monthly or more frequent diversion reports “when flows or projections are sufficient to 
support some but not all . . . diversion demand”). 
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for [their] protection.”124 In short, the transfer process is a lengthy, 
administratively demanding, and cost-intensive process. Increased 
incentives, such as the availability of state funding and transfer 
facilitation programs to incentivize transfers, may improve the 
marketability of this option in the future.125 
Next, in 2001 the California state legislature updated water 
appropriation obligations in the environmental review requirements for 
the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) under SB 610 and 
SB 221. These “assured supply laws” require developers to provide a 
water supply assessment for new housing developments of 500 or more 
units as part of the CEQA review process.126 This assessment instructs 
developers “to prove they have secured adequate water stock before 
commencing construction”127 based on “water availability during 
normal, dry, and multi-dry years over a projected twenty-year 
period.”128 The California Urban Water Management Planning Act129 
directs urban water utilities to develop a long-term, frequently updated, 
water supply plan for their service areas to streamline developers’ 
review of available water resources.130 Despite this effort, California 
has a history of weak regulatory oversight of utility compliance.131 
Commentators argue that the execution of assured supply laws will be 
further complicated due to a “lack of coordination and comprehensive 
planning” by suppliers that share water resources “and overly 
optimistic assumptions of the availability and reliability” of existing 
124 CAL. WATER CODE § 1701.2(c) (West 2016). 
125 CAL. WATER CODE §§ 470–484 (West 1986). California’s Costa-Isenberg Water 
Transfer Act of 1986 established a state funding and assistance program to incentivize and 
simplify voluntary water transfers. 
126 SB 610 (Ca. 2001) amended CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10631, 10656, 10910, 10911, 
10912, and 10915; repealed § 10913; and added and repealed § 10657 (relating to urban 
water planning requirements and water assured laws); SB 221 (Ca. 2001) amended CAL. 
GOV’T CODE § 65867.5 and added § 66455.3 and § 66473.7 (requiring municipalities to 
conduct water security and assured supply assessments and adding assured water supply 
requirements for CEQA environmental review for development approval). 
127 Lincoln L. Davies, Just a Big, “Hot Fuss”? Assessing the Value of Connecting 
Suburban Sprawl, Land Use, and Water Rights Through Assured Supply Laws, 34 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 1217, 1217 (2007). 
128 Mudd, supra note 13, at 9–10 (citing CAL. WATER CODE § 10910(b)(3) (West 
2012)). 
129 CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10610–10657 (West 2015). 
130 Mudd, supra note 13, at 10. 
131 Weak regulatory oversight has resulted in reliance on citizen enforcement. Ellen 
Hanak, Show Me the Water Plan: Urban Water Management Plans and California’s Water 
Supply Adequacy Laws, 4 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVTL. L.J. 69, 71 (2010). 
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water supplies to cope with their current over appropriated status 
exacerbated by climate change.132 
Even with state water law requirements that prevent waste, 
accommodate interbasin water right transfers, and implement assured 
supply laws, the undisputable truth for water managers remains: one 
cannot use water that does not exist. While prior appropriation appears 
to be equitable on its face, following the tenet “first in time, first in 
right,” the system requires little to no variation of historic trends in 
watershed hydrology or precipitation to operate. In application, prior 
appropriation gives full allocations to senior appropriators before 
junior appropriators may receive any water, which yields an 
“everybody loses” result in the face of declining supplies.133 Without 
state intervention to address this defect in prior appropriation, limited 
water supplies may act as a “de facto constraint on growth” in some 
areas.134 Thus, adaptation efforts in response to the impact of climate 
change on water resources must focus on proactive management 
strategies at the state level, in conjunction with local governments to 
contain the health and economic impacts of water supply scarcity to 
existing and future users. 
III 
STATE AND LOCAL LEADERSHIP IN CLIMATE ADAPTATION 
PLANNING 
While climate change will need to be addressed at all levels of 
government, studies suggest that local governments may be in the best 
position to understand vulnerabilities,135 minimize consequential costs 
of natural disasters,136 and plan for local environmental quality.137 In 
California, local governments are particularly well positioned to 
address the impacts of climate change to water resources and water-
related natural hazards for a number of reasons. First, directed by the 
132 Mudd, supra note 13 at 10. 
133 Adler, supra note 4, at 24. 
134 Id. at 23 (citing A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Weterling, Western Growth and 
Sustainable Use: If There Are No “Natural Limits,” Should We Worry About Water 
Supplies?, 27 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 33 (2006)).  
135 CITY OF FREMONT, CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 7–3 (2012). 
136 Salkin, supra note 2, at 10159–60 (explaining that the national cost of damage from 
natural disasters in flood-prone areas is approximately $5 billion, annually). 
137 Id. at 10158. 
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California legislature,138 local governments are at the “front line of 
regulating a myriad of environmental concerns” through long-term, 
comprehensive general plans.139 These general plans precede all 
government decisions on the use and development of land.140 And some 
communities are beginning to include climate change policies 
voluntarily.141 Next, “while local governments are not the principal 
regulators of water, they are integral partners in planning and 
implementing water-related initiatives alongside tribal, state, federal, 
and private partners.”142 Local governments can bridge legal 
fragmentation of federal flood and water quality control143 and state 
laws governing water allocation and use regimes144 by cooperatively 
planning for long-term development and water resource use within 
their jurisdiction. Finally, in the context of natural hazards, land use 
planning is a key tool for government to effectuate natural disaster 
mitigation, which has been identified by experts to be “almost 
exclusively a local government function.”145  
At the time of this writing, many local governments in California 
have already begun to include climate change in local plans.146 
138 CA. GOV. CODE § 65300 (West 2018) (granting local city governments the authority 
to adopt and implement a comprehensive general plan for the long-term physical 
development of lands within or outside its jurisdictional boundaries, so long as the latter is 
determined by the planning agency to bear relation to its planning). 
139 Mudd, supra note 13, at 4–5. 
140 David L. Callies et al., Balancing Water Values and Human Needs in an Enlightened 
Land Use Planning Regime, in WET GROWTH: SHOULD WATER LAW CONTROL LAND USE? 
358 (Craig A. Arnold ed., 2005). 
141 GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, STATE OF CALIFORNIA: 
GENERAL PLAN GUIDELINES 337, 341 (2017) [hereinafter GENERAL PLAN GUIDELINES]. 
142 Mudd, supra note 13, at 5. 
143 Federal mandates require cities’ compliance with water quality regulations, such as 
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (addressing water pollution through dilution) and 
the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C §§ 1531–44 (protecting aquatic species in climate-
stressed waters). 
144 “[S]ince at least the middle of the nineteenth century, state water law has reigned 
supreme as the primary authority governing the allocation and use of water resources, as 
proclaimed by Congress, the executive branch, and the courts.” Adler, supra note 4, at 4 
(footnote omitted) (citing Federal Power Act § 27, 16 U.S.C. § 821; Clean Water Act of 
1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e), (g); Desert Lands Act of 1877, 43 U.S.C. §§ 321–39; 
Reclamation Act of 1902 § 8, 43 U.S.C. § 383; California v. United States, 483 U.S. 645, 
653 (1978); United States v. New Mexico, 483 U.S. 696, 702 (1978); California v. Beaver 
Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 162 (1935)). 
145 James Wilkins, Is Sea Level Rise “Foreseeable”? Does It Matter?, 26 J. LAND USE 
& ENVTL. L. 437, 449 (2011). 
146 As is demonstrated in the “Results” section of this Article, these plans range from 
nonbinding specific plans (e.g., climate action plans) to legally binding plan mandates (e.g., 
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Ultimately, these plans have largely focused on “climate mitigation 
through emissions reductions,” energy conservation, and “green 
building design.”147 While California’s climate mitigation policies are 
leading the country with measurable success of its climate mitigation 
policies,148 the state has been slow to move beyond mitigation to adapt 
to the projected impacts of climate change to land and water resources. 
Stated simply, the state must bring climate change prevention and 
preparedness to a level playing field.149  
To this end, many cities in California have adopted a range of plans 
to address, set, and implement mitigation and adaptation targets. In 
large part, this movement was encouraged at the federal level with 
President Obama’s Executive Orders (EO) 13,632150 and 13,653.151 
These EOs directed federal agencies to adopt climate action plans that 
opened federal information sharing and investment programs for state 
general plans or building codes). See generally CITY OF ANTIOCH, ANTIOCH COMMUNITY 
CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (2011) (proposing a range of voluntary initiatives for climate 
mitigation related to water resources and use). But see CITY OF RICHMOND, CITY OF 
RICHMOND CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (2016) (establishing enforceable climate change 
policies in the comprehensive general plan). 
147 Mudd, supra note 13, at 20. 
148 For example, in 2015 California reached its 2016 interim goal for 25% of electricity 
to be generated by renewable energy and has already contracted with resource providers to 
meet 41–45% of electricity demand by renewables by 2030 (which has a target goal set for 
33%). Arroyo, supra note 11, at 311; see also NATIONAL CITY, CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, 1–
11 to –20 (2011) (describing state, regional, and local initiatives addressing climate change 
in the state). 
149 See, e.g., Ileana M. Porras, The City and International Law: In Pursuit of Sustainable 
Development, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 537, 593 (2009) (“Most climate change experts and 
policy-makers recognize that adaptation and mitigation are not mutually exclusive strategies 
but must, on the contrary be employed in tandem.”); Peter Hayes, Resilience as Emergent 
Behavior, 15 HASTINGS W. NORTHWEST J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 175, 175 (2009) (“[T]he 
main game is now not adaptation which renders mitigation no less urgent but shifts the 
political equation in dramatic ways that cannot be ignored any longer.”). 
150 Exec. Order No. 13,632, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,341 (Dec. 12, 2012). This executive order 
directed the Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force (task force) to identify and 
eliminate “obstacles to resilient rebuilding in a manner that addresses existing and future 
risks and vulnerabilities and promotes the long-term sustainability of communities and 
ecosystems.” Id. at 74,342.  
151 Exec. Order No. 13,653, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,819 (Nov. 1, 2013) was a result of the task 
force’s recommendations, which found that—in responding to natural disaster Hurricane 
Sandy—regional and local stakeholders were best positioned to effectuate adaptation 
projects and reduce “risk[s] of unplanned redundancies or gaps in resilience.” HURRICANE 
SANDY REBUILDING TASK FORCE, HURRICANE SANDY REBUILDING STRATEGY: 
STRONGER COMMUNITIES, A RESILIENT REGION 54 (2013).  
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and local climate change resilience planning.152 For example, the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) climate action plan directs 
the agency to assist local government and water managers to develop 
adaptation programs to safeguard water quality standards. 
[A] key challenge will be how to help local decision makers 
understand potential local impacts, and how to make long-term plans 
under a new range of uncertainty about future hydrologic conditions 
. . . . EPA, working with its state, tribal, and local partners, is 
responsible for developing and implementing a portfolio of 
regulatory and non-regulatory programs to protect and improve water 
quality [for] the nation’s . . . waters. As better information is 
developed for local decision making, changes may be needed in how 
EPA and our partners implement water quality programs . . . .153 
Today, federal climate research, policy, and funding programs have 
been seriously challenged by the Trump administration. Specifically, 
President Trump’s EO 13,783 rescinded many Obama-era climate 
change programs, including the climate action plan mandate of EO 
13,653.154 While the reduction in federal administrative support is a 
huge setback for coordination and funding from federal partners, the 
regional and local governments in California continue to independently 
adopt comprehensive climate action plans and commit to climate 
mitigation and adaptation efforts, despite diminished federal support.155 
Given the challenges of climate uncertainty, the pervasiveness of 
mitigation planning with weak (or missing) adaptation components, 
fragmentation, and the current lack of federal leadership, the call for 
cities to adapt to climate change is a huge undertaking.156 Over the last 
decade, climate action plans have been adopted at the state, regional, 
and municipal level and have served as guiding documents to 
152 78 Fed. Reg. 66,819, 66,821. 
153 U.S. EPA, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION PLAN, No. EPA 100-K-14-001 24 
(2014). 
154 Presidential Executive Order on Promoting Energy Independence and Economic 
Growth, Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,094 (Mar. 28, 2017). “[E]ach 
agency shall, as soon as practicable, suspend, revise, or rescind, or publish for notice and 
comment proposed rules suspending, revising, or rescinding any such actions, as appropriate 
and consistent with law and with the policies [of this order]s” Id. 
155 According to the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives’ Global 
Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy, there are currently 177 cities in the United 
States that have signed on to independently pursue climate mitigation and adaptation 
policies. Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy, Regions: North America 
query “United States” https://www.globalcovenantofmayors.org/cities/ (follow cities 
hyperlink and then search by country “United States”) (last visited Nov. 18, 2018). 
156 See Gremillion, supra note 13, at 1253. 
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comprehensively address climate change. The plans contain a wide 
range of efforts to reach emissions goals in transportation, residential 
use, and industry, as well as environmental goals such as minimizing 
impacts to water resources and sustainable resource consumption.157 At 
the local level, climate action planning results from the intersection of 
different stakeholder interests, climate expertise, and governance 
structures.158  
This Article proposes that the local climate action plan may serve as 
the foundational step for communities to holistically achieve climate 
adaptation. The plan is foundational, since it serves as a platform to 
consolidate information on local climate and water resource conditions 
and the fragmented regulatory and nonregulatory policies across water 
resources, emergency preparedness, and land use planning actions. But 
it is also foundational because, without more, climate action plans are 
simply aspirational, nonregulatory documents. Thus, this Article 
recommends that (1) climate preparedness for water resources can be 
achieved through “adaptation-embeddedness” in municipal climate 
action plans and (2) integrating these plans into the general planning 
framework is a regulatory solution for local governments to take a 
proactive leadership role in comprehensively managing water 
resources.  
A. Adaptation-Embeddedness for Water Resources in Municipal 
Climate Action Plans 
There is little policy scholarship that investigates the 
“embeddedness” of adaptation elements in climate action plans.159 This 
section evaluates adaptation-embeddedness in climate action plans 
from sixty-nine California cities in Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
(MSA).160 
1. Methodology
This study used a qualitative approach of content analysis to evaluate
adopted climate action plans and general plans from California cities 
157 Koski & Siulagi, supra note 28, at 271–72. 
158 Id. at 271. 
159 See id. at 285. 
160 This population criterion is consistent with the U.S. Census Bureau’s definition for 
densely populated urbanized areas. U.S CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 Census Urban Area FAQs, 
https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/ua/uafaq.html (Sept. 9, 2017). 
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with populations of more than fifty thousand. Data was collected in a 
three-step process that included collection, filtering, and coding.161 
Only climate action plans that included water-related adaptation 
elements and the corresponding general plan162 (if present) were 
eligible for this study.  
Using content analysis,163 the coding scheme was designed to 
describe the level of integration in land use plans for water-related 
natural hazards, numbering each on a scale from one to five. Cities that 
did not plan for water-related natural hazard adaptation were 
designated Level 1, even if the plan comprehensively plans for other 
climate-related hazards. A Level 2 code indicated that the plan directed 
attention at water-related adaptation, but at a low level. For example, 
plans that include a short or broad statement on reducing water-related 
climate impacts, without further acknowledgement received a level two 
code.  
Level 3 coded plans are plans that developed water-related planning 
further but focused exclusively on traditional climate mitigation themes 
with no adaptation elements. A Level 3, for example, included a section 
on increasing energy efficiency at wastewater treatment plants through 
water conservation measures, installation of biogas capture, and biogas 
to energy technologies.164 Level 3 plans are distinguishable from Level 
4 plans because they did not mention water hazards outside the context 
of climate mitigation. 
Level 4 plans discussed water-related hazard adaptation impacts, 
reduction and adaption strategies, and implementation, but they lacked 
concrete policies to combat the direct impacts of climate change or they 
focused solely on community education and outreach. That is, they 
were distinguishable as a “plan to plan.”165 Finally, Level 5 plans 
showed the highest level of water-related adaptation planning with 
significant commitment to specific local water-related hazards and 
161 Koski & Siulagi, supra note 28, at 276. 
162 These municipalities were selected through designation by the 2016 California 
Jurisdictions Addressing Climate Change report prepared by the Governor’s Office of 
Planning and Research. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLANNING & RESEARCH, 2016 California 
Jurisdictions Addressing Climate Change (2016) http://www.opr.ca.gov/docs/2016_ 
California_Jurisdictions_Addressing_Climate_Change_Summary.pdf [hereinafter GOPR]. 
163 In planning literature, content analysis is described as “a research technique for the 
objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication.” BERNARD BERELSON, CONTENT ANALYSIS IN COMMUNICATION 
RESEARCH 18 (1952). 
164 CITY OF COLTON, CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 3-2 (2015). 
165 Koski & Siulagi, supra note 28, at 278. 
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concrete, actionable ways to mitigate and adapt through identified 
conceptual, structural, and planning mechanisms. 
2. Results
There were 176 MSA cities in California that qualified for this study.
Of this number, 39% of municipalities (sixty-nine MSAs) had adopted 
climate action plans. The results from coding the sixty-nine climate 
action plans and thirty-five general plans eligible for this study 
generally demonstrated that while many of the actionable strategies 
presented in the plans aggressively address greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction targets through mitigation, the plans generally failed to 
present specific, implementable solutions for climate adaptation that 
reach beyond “planning to plan.”  
Specifically, fewer than 20% of all climate166 and general plans167 
went beyond identifying water adaptation as a “primary issue” of 
climate change planning and included concrete, actionable ways to 
implement adaptation measures. The highest-scoring plans include 
actionable measures to reduce urban water consumption and flood risks 
to infrastructure and low-lying developments. Notably, none of these 
adaptation measures called for diverting development from 
floodplains; rather, local governments appeared to prefer hard 
structural or “green” infrastructure solutions to absorb disastrous flood 
events.168 There was no statistically significant variation in population 
size, city general revenue, location, or plan age between cities with 
high-scoring or low-scoring plans.  
The majority (more than 80%) of climate action and general plans 
failed to move beyond mitigation planning. All coded plans 
comprehensively planned for climate mitigation such as smog 
166 A total of eleven climate action plans were coded at Level 5 for adaptation-
embeddedness of water resources in this study: Encinitas, San Marcos, Manteca, Santa 
Barbara, Pleasanton, Sacramento, Richmond, Berkeley, Corona, Fullerton, and Hesperia. 
167 A total of eight general plans were coded at Level 5 for adaptation-embeddedness of 
water resources: Manteca, Santa Barbara, Dublin, Fremont, Pleasanton, Sacramento, and 
Richmond. Five of these cities also received a Level 5 code for corresponding climate action 
plans. 
168 See, e.g., CITY OF RICHMOND, RICHMOND GENERAL PLAN 2030: LAND USE AND 
URBAN DESIGN 3.74 (2012), http://www.ci.richmond.ca.us/DocumentCenter/View/8809/ 
30-Land-Use-and-Urban-Design-Element?bidId= (Land Use Element 6.4 of the Richmond 
General Plan calls for using green infrastructure as a strategy to reduce stormwater runoff). 
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reduction through vehicle emissions regulations169 or codifying state-
mandated building efficiency standards in general plan policies170 to 
increase the livability of a city (e.g., air pollution reduction measures 
resulting in cobenefit of cleaner air). But alone, as explained above, 
these efforts cannot adequately address the full range of causes, risks, 
and impacts of climate change.171 Where these lower-scoring plans did 
include adaptation planning goals, the goals were “aspirational,” free-
standing statements that lacked actionable policies and integration with 
regulatory mechanisms.  
There is a series of reasons that climate action planning in California 
has primarily focused on mitigation, with the nominal inclusion of 
adaptation. First, as discussed throughout this Article, there are 
complex fragmentation issues between federal, state, and local actors 
with the authority to manage water resources for climate adaptation. 
Second, while climate mitigation policy has dominated state climate 
policy initiatives over the last two decades, there has been relatively 
little guidance from the state to achieve adaptation policies at the local 
level. 172 This lack of regulatory guidance has left cities to voluntarily 
undergo climate adaptation planning. As seen by the relatively low 
participation rate from cities to voluntarily produce climate action 
plans, it is clear that the lack of regulatory guidelines has slowed 
progress. 
B. A Municipal Climate Action Plan That “Sticks”: Advocating for 
a Water-Climate Element in the General Plan 
To address the impact of voluntariness of climate adaptation and the 
lack of enforceable adaptation measures therein, this Article suggests 
that the state include a water-climate element in the general plan 
requirements for local governments. The general land use plan is the 
superior municipal regulatory document to which all other planning 
169 Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, A.B. 32, 2006 Assemb. (Cal. 2006). 
170 See, e.g., CITY OF LA HABRA, CITY OF LA HABRA CLIMATE ACTION PLAN app. E 
(2014), http://www.lahabracity.com/DocumentCenter/View/192/Climate-Action-Plan-PDF 
?bidId= (requiring new residential construction to meet state-mandated energy efficiency 
targets). 
171 See Pielke, supra note 18 (discussing limitations of mitigation strategies and calling 
for advancing the role of adaptation in climate policy). 
172 See Table 1 California Regulatory Framework Summary–Climate Legislation (on 
file with author). 
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actions. 173 California courts have upheld this principle often, stating in 
one decision that the general land use plan serves as the “constitution 
for all future developments within the [c]ity. Similarly, planning 
actions for present and projected use and treatment of water fall within 
the city’s planning authority and must be consistent with the general 
plan.174 All other planning actions, such as zoning, structural codes, and 
subdivision regulations must be consistent with the goals and policies 
of the general plan.  
In effectuating plan policies, zoning offers an opportunity to 
conjunctively manage water resources and hazards through a proposed 
water-climate element and the existing land use element. In practice, 
“[z]oning is the most powerful tool that local governments have to 
preemptively mitigate hazards.”175 Under a local government’s zoning 
authority, a municipality may develop enforceable law that controls the 
location, type, and density of new development and re-development. 
Professor Patricia Salkin lists effective disaster mitigation strategies 
included in a local government’s zoning toolbox such as “limitations 
on how property may be developed in flood zones; setbacks from fault 
lines . . . , steep slopes, . . . coastal erosion areas; and overlay zones that 
introduce additional requirements over sensitive environmental areas 
such as wetlands, dunes, and hillsides.” 176 Another useful outcome of 
linking the water-climate element with the land use element, is the 
ability of the general plan to define “nonconforming” land uses in 
specific land use zones. Nonconforming uses occur when the zoning 
district or zoning regulation of a site changes and the current land use 
on the site no longer conforms to the uses permitted.177 The intent of 
the nonconforming use characterization is not to “force all non-
conforming situations immediately” but to “guide nonconforming 
situations in a new direction consistent with [c]ity policy, and, 
eventually, bring them into conformance.”178 The process of phasing 
173 Lesher Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 802 P.2d 317, 322 (Cal. 1990) 
(citing deBottari v. Norco City Council, 217 Cal. Rptr. 790, 793–94 (Ct. App. 1985)). 
174 See GENERAL PLAN GUIDELINES, supra note 141 at 111–14. 
175 Jessica Grannis, ZONING FOR SEA-LEVEL RISE: A MODEL SEA-LEVEL RISE 
ORDINANCE AND CASE STUDY OF IMPLEMENTATION BARRIERS IN MARYLAND 2 
(Dec. 2012) (prepublication draft), https://www.georgetownclimate.org/files/report/Zoning 
%20for%20Sea-Level%20Rise%20Executive%20Summary%20Final.pdf. 
176 Salkin, supra note 2, at 10,165. 
177 OR. CITY, OR., MUNICIPAL CODE § 17.58.010 (2004). 
178 Id. 
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out nonconforming uses (amortization) is a particularly relevant legal 
concept to planning since significant amounts of land in American 
cities were developed within high-risk areas and are susceptible to a 
nonconforming use classification under updated disaster mitigation 
zoning measures. However, in most cases, the amortization period 
takes an excessive amount of time, due to the amortization process 
taking on a similar legal “reasonableness” test for finding a nuisance in 
property use.179 Regardless, local governments retain the authority to 
characterize risky uses in disaster-prone locations and to establish a 
time frame for the property to be brought into conformance.  
In disaster scenarios, amortization for nonconforming use is 
typically enforced post-disaster, in rebuilding restrictions. For 
example, looking beyond California, after the 1993 “Great Flood” in 
Des Moines, Iowa, city officials recognized that some large-scale 
property damage occurred to nonconforming structures. In rebuilding 
actions after the flood, the city applied zoning ordinances to prohibit 
redevelopment of nonconforming structures with damage of more than 
sixty percent of replacement value. The response to the Des Moines 
1993 flood is an example of successful enforcement of land use 
regulations that prevent potential future damage to the same properties. 
Moving forward, low-lying Californian cities can use nonconforming 
use classifications with smart growth principles to prevent any 
redevelopment of nonconforming structures in hazard mitigation 
zones. 
However, relocating communities from natural hazards comes at a 
huge cost with legal obstacles. At the time of this writing, the cities of 
Richmond and Oakland have filed separate tort lawsuits against major 
producers and distributors of fossil fuels (including BP, Chevron 
Conoco Phillips, Exxon Mobil, and Shell) for damages in the amount 
to cover costs incurred to develop sea walls and other infrastructure and 
to relocate residents and property from the global-warming induced 
sea-level rise.180  
Finally, in conformance with general plan policies, local 
governments can enact zoning requirements in critical and sensitive 
179 City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 274 P.2d 34, 43 (Cal. 2d Dist. Ct. 1954) (explaining 
the factors for determining “reasonableness” in amortization, including (1) length of time 
the amortization is allowed; (2) nature of the business; (3) improvements to the property; 
(4) character of the neighborhood; etc.). 
180 First Amended Complaint for Pub. Nuisance, City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., No. 3:17-
cv-06011-WHA (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 03, 2018); Complaint, City of Richmond v. Chevron 
Corp., No. C18-00055 (Super. Ct. Cal. filed Jan. 22, 2018). 
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environmental areas to prohibit or limit use in disaster-prone areas. The 
American Planning Association defines critical areas as places that 
“contain or constitute natural resources sensitive to excessive or 
inappropriate development.”181 This definition of critical areas can be 
expanded to include areas that are prone to natural hazards, the 
development of which may result in damaging disaster losses to the 
natural and built environments. In light of this, the Administrative 
Procedures Act’s guidance for model ordinances calls for prohibiting 
particular uses, activities, and structures in critical or sensitive areas.182 
Notably, this approach works whether a natural hazard endangers a 
critical or sensitive area or benefits it, such as seasonal flooding in 
wetland areas.183 
CONCLUSION 
There are significant obstacles to climate adaptation planning for 
water resources. Obstacles range from the “vertical” fragmentation in 
the division of management authority across federal, state, and local 
government184 and “horizontal” fragmentation by the multiple 
government entities tasked with land, emergency preparedness, and 
water decision-making authority within a single level of government.185 
In addition, the preferential treatment of regulators toward climate 
mitigation over adaptation planning actions has severely slowed 
progress for climate change preparedness. Finally, voluntary planning 
actions such as the climate action plan are nominally successful in 
generating clear, actionable, and enforceable goals for water resources 
climate adaptation management. However, it is argued that integrating 
climate action plans or a climate planning element into municipal 
general plans presents an opportunity to turn these obstacles into 
“opportunities.” This integration will require state leadership to 
generate regulatory mandates, guidance, and support; and local 
leadership to enact creative, concrete, and place-based strategies that 
181 AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK: 
MODEL STATUTES FOR PLANNING AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE 9–3 (Stuart Meck 
ed., 2002). 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Arnold, supra note 29, at 37–38. 
185 Id. at 38–39. 
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manage water resources and prepare cities for the impacts of climate 
change. 
